DETENTION STATUTES (Updated as of February 2021)
| Domestic Exception | Court needs to make written findings that respite care is not available AND that it’s necessary to detain the child to protect the victim from injury.
The child may not be held in SD under this subsection >48 hours unless ordered by the court. After 48 hours, the court should hold a review hearing if the State or Victim requests continued detention. The child may continue to be held in detention if the court makes a specific, written finding that detention is necessary to protect the victim from injury. The child may not be held longer than the time limits in 985.26 (21 days in most situations) |
985.255(2) |
| More Restrictive Detention Status than DRAI | Court needs clear and convincing reasons in writing why it is disregarding the DRAI score | 985.255(3)(b) |
| 72 hours Detention for Comprehensive Evaluation | If residential commitment is anticipated or recommended – this may also be extended 72 additional hours | 985.26(5) |
| Upward (or downward) Deviation from PDR Recommendation for Disposition | Court must give reasons related to the characteristics of the restrictiveness level and the needs of the child – the reasons have to be supported by the record and established by a preponderance of the evidence | 985.433(7)(b) |
| 21 Day Trial + 9 Days Extension | Court can extend detention to 30 days with good cause; must be violent F2, F1s, PBL, etc | 985.26(2) |
| 15 Days Detention between Plea/Trial and Disposition | No exceptions to this time limit in statute | 985.26(3) |
| Detention Pending Placement in Commitment Program | All children who are adjudicated and awaiting placement in a nonsecure, high risk, or maximum risk residential commitment program must be placed in secure detention pending placement. | 985.27 |
| Contempt | 5 days for first contempt, 15 days for second or subsequent violations.
Court must follow proper procedure in finding child in contempt. |
985.037 |
| Prolific Juvenile Offender (PJO) | Shall be placed on supervised release detention care with electronic monitoring or in secure detention care until disposition. If secure detention is ordered it may not exceed 21 days unless an adjudicatory hearing has begun or 15 days after the entry of an order of adjudication. | 985.255(1)(f) for PJO definition/qualifications
985.26(c) for detention statute |
| Detained Arraignments | If a child is detained and a petition for delinquency is filed, the child shall be arraigned within 48 hours after the filing of the petition. | 985.26(6) |
| Continuances Extending Detention Time Limits | The time limits (21 days or 30 days pre-trial or 15 days pending disposition) do not include periods of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court for cause on motion of the child or his or her counsel or of the state. The court shall conduct 72 hour review hearings to determine the need for continued detention and the need for continuance of proceedings. | 985.26(4)(a) |
FLORIDA CASE LAW RE: DETENTION
| J.J. v. Fryer
765 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) |
Assigning points for aggravating and mitigating factors is to be done by DJJ, not by the judge. | |
| D.G. v. Miles
872 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) |
The DRAI may not be “double scored:’ additional “aggravating points” may not be included for anything that has already been covered by the DRAI. It was improper for the court to aggravate the DRAI score because the child was on release status on another case when he was arrested on the new charge; those points had already been calculated under the Legal Status section of the DRAI. | |
| P.A.J. v. Gnat
684 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) |
The DRAI may not be “double scored:” additional “aggravating points” may not be included for anything that has already been covered by the DRAI. It was improper for the court to aggravate the DRAI score because the child was on release status on another case when he was arrested on the new charge; those points had already been calculated under the Legal Status section of the DRAI. | |
| S.W. v. Woolsey
673 So. 2d 152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) |
A child on release status may only be placed in detention if the original DRAI is introduced into evidence and has been rescored to reflect a detention status, based on newly discovered evidence or changed circumstances.
**Followed and cited by courts in all five DCAs; Shepardize for recent rulings. |
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| R.G. v. State
817 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) |
A child may not be held in secure detention without a DRAI score calculation. | |
| B.M. v. Dobuler
979 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) |
Even where there is evidence to show a child is totally out of control and the court fears that child may abscond, the court cannot place her in secure detention without a DRAI score calculation. | |
| DEVIATION FROM THE DRAI SCORE
CROSS-REFERENCE: FLA. STAT. CH. 985.245; 985.25; 985.255 |
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| M.P. v. Gardner
838 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) |
Written reasons that lack detail and are based on unsworn testimony are not “weighty or important enough to warrant a variation from the RAI.” | |
| J.J. v. Fryer
765 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) |
Written reasons to support deviation from the DRAI score must be “weighty” and “important” and “gleaned from the record and evidence and consistent with the statutes. | |
| K.E. v. Dept. of Juvenile Justice
963 So. 2d 864 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) |
A parent’s stated fears that a child might run away, use drugs, and have sex are not sufficient to justify departure from the DRAI score (2 points) in a domestic battery case, especially where the child’s attorney had found alternative respite care placement. Even a placement on home detention pending disposition was illegal, because there were no written findings of the reason to detain under the “departure provision” OR risk of future harm under the domestic violence provision. | |
| DETENTION PERIOD AFTER INITIAL ARREST
CROSS-REFERENCE FLA. STAT. CH. 985.26 |
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| S.B. v. Parkins
10 So. 3d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) |
A court may not extend the initial 21-day detention period, where a trial has not commenced and the court’s reason for continuing detention was “danger to the community,” which is not a statutory reason to continue detention | |
| T.O. v. Alachua Regional JDC
668 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) |
After the initial 21-day period, the court may not extend the detention status or order a new detention status. | |
| C.A.F. v. State
976 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) |
Judges do not have the power to use a “behavior order” to control a child beyond the initial 21-day detention period. | |
| J.S. v. State
975 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) |
Judges may place a child on a 21-day “behavior order” as a less-restrictive alternative to home detention or secure detention. | |
| M.A.M v. Vurro (State)
2 So. 3d 388 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) |
The maximum pre-trial detention period for a child charged with a domestic offense is 21 days, the same as all other offenses. | |
| FAILURE TO APPEAR
CROSS-REFERENCE: FLA. STAT. CH. 985.255(1)(I),(J) |
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| A.K. v. Doubler
951 So. 2d 989 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) |
A Failure to Appear, standing alone, does not allow a court to order secure detention for 21 days, even where the child had run away for 2 months, the judge believe the child would run away again if released, and the DCF case worker did not come to the hearing. | |
| M.P. v. Gardner
838 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) |
(in dicta) A child arrested for FTA who previously failed to appear for a properly noticed hearing in the same case may be held in secure detention for up to 72 hours, regardless of the DRAI score. | |
| VIOLATION OF PROBATION
CROSS REFERENCE: FLA. STAT CH. 985.255(1)(H) |
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| R.A.P. v. Parkins
995 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) |
A child arrested for a Violation of Probation only may not be held in secure detention, he may only be placed on home detention, with electronic monitoring where available. | |
| T.D.S v. State
922 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) |
A child arrested for a Violation of Probation only may not be held in secure detention, he may only be placed on home detention, with electronic monitoring where available. | |
| B.L.G. v. State
928 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) |
A child arrested for a Violation of Probation only may not be held in secure detention, he may only be placed on home detention, with electronic monitoring where available. | |
| VIOLATION OF HOME DETENTION
CROSS-REFERENCE: FLA. STAT. CH. 985.245; 985.25; 985.255; 985.26;985.27 |
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| R.J.L. v. State
22 So. 3d 130 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) |
When a child was on home detention and was arrested on a new charge, the child may not be held in secure detention and was released to home detention (because it was his prior status), where the child did not meet detention criteria (scored 0 points), and the just did not make written findings of his reasons for deviation from the DRAI. | |
| D.L.W. v. State
931 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) |
If a child violates home detention pending placement in a commitment program, the maximum sanction he can receive is 5 days in secure detention for first offense, and 15 days for a second or subsequent offense. | |
| T.W. v. Edwards-Ellis
903 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) |
If a child violates home detention pending placement in a commitment program, the maximum sanction he can receive is 5 days in secure detention for first offense, and 15 days for a second or subsequent offense. | |
| J.B. v. Rayford
797 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) |
If a child violates home detention pending placement in a commitment program, the maximum sanction he can receive is 5 days in secure detention for first offense, and 15 days for a second or subsequent offense. | |
| ABSCONDING SUPERVISION
CROSS-REFERENCE: FLA. STAT. CH. 985.24, 985.245; 985.25; 985.255(I)(A); 985.275 |
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| Z.B. v. Dept of Juvenile Justice
938 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) |
A child who merely breaks curfew is not an absconder and cannot be held in secure detention for “absconding supervision.”
**Very good, very narrow definition of “absconder” as someone who runs away or escapes, with the purpose of avoiding court process and no intent of returning. |
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| B.M. v. Dobuler
979 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) |
A child who leaves home often without reporting her whereabouts but always came to court voluntarily was not an absconder, where there was no evidence that she was, hiding, concealing, or absenting herself, or that her purpose in leaving home was to avoid court process. | |
| B.M. DISTINGUISED BY T.J.S | ||
| T.J.S. v. Miles
96 So. 3d 1104 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) |
T.J.S distinguished B.M. by stating that a child is found to abscond if they purposely absent themselves from court ordered supervision. This does not occur from a breaking curfew or leaving for short periods of time. The child in this case was found to absent herself in such a manner the court inferred her intent was to avoid supervision and the legal process outlined in her probation order. | |